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Abstract

The debate on the issue of child soldiers in international law has been mainly
framed around the narrow question of whether child soldiers should be prosecuted or
deemed innocent victims. This question, while essential, marginalized several
considerations related to the multidimensional and intersecting identities and roles of child
soldiers. Few scholars have investigated and evidenced the major gaps related to the legal
protection of child soldiers in international law. While recognizing the potential related to
the analysis on child soldiers’ criminal liability, this research proposes to focus on the
examination of their vulnerabilities and to explore the legal foundations for the
strengthening of their legal protection.
Thus, this project is not a mere recognition of child soldiers as innocent victims but
a careful and extensive examination of several areas of Public International Law such as
International Humanitarian Law, International Criminal Law and International Human
Rights Law to justify the necessity to establish a stronger and exhaustive legal protection
for child soldiers. Most importantly, this research illustrates the reason why child soldiers
keep their status as children, despite their status or conduct during armed conflicts, and the
ensuing consequences and impacts of such findings for the principle of distinction in
International Humanitarian Law.

Key words: child soldiers, direct participation, active participation, combatants, special
protection, principle of distinction.
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Introduction

Children are impacted in various ways and at multiple levels during armed
conflicts: some are killed, maimed, abducted to become soldiers or sexually abused,
whereas others are psychologically exploited.”

1

This Major Research Project (MRP)

acknowledges that children are not only passive victims in armed conflicts, but that some
of them can display “tactical agency to cope with the concrete, immediate conditions of
their lives created by their violent military environment.”2
Nevertheless, the main focus of this paper will be on the vulnerabilities of child
soldiers and on the need to improve their legal protection during armed conflicts. As
Drumbl notes, while “it seems fundamentally unfounded to stereotype all child soldiers as
depersonalized tools of atrocity or as weapons systems industrially committing crimes
against humanity”, it can no longer be seriously disputed that “where there is armed
conflict, invariably, there are child soldiers.”3 The 2016 International Criminal Court (ICC)
Policy on Children has recognized that “children are present, both in armed forces of states
and in non-state armed groups.”4
Despite the impossibility of assessing with precision the exact number of children
recruited or used by armed groups or armed forces, there is a consistent use of the figure
of 300,000 child soldiers both by humanitarian organizations, researchers and by

1

Secretary-General, Promotion and protection of the rights of children: impact of armed conflict on
children, GA, 51st session, 1996, A/51/306 at 4 [Graça Machel Report].
2
Alcinda Honwana, Child soldiers in Africa (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006) at 71.
3
Mark Drumbl, Reimagining Child Soldiers in International Law and Policy (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2012) at 85, 26.
4
International Criminal Court, “Policy on Children” (November 2016), The office of the Prosecutor at 20,
online: <https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/20161115_OTP_ICC_Policy-on-Children_Eng.PDF>.
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academics as being the most authoritative and accurate number on child soldiers.5 Armed
groups or governmental forces often prefer recruiting or abducting children because they
are easier to manipulate and to control than adults.6 In his article entitled “Generic
guidelines for the use of force against ‘child soldiers’ in peace operations”, Lieutenant
Colonel Leandro highlights that “children eat less, drink less, are not paid, serve as pack
animals, are able to cook, can collect wood without drawing attention”, and that they
normally have no next of kin to worry about them and consequently are replaceable and
disposable.”7 Unsurprisingly, all these reasons make children extremely coveted in the eye
of belligerents. The Canadian Forces Joint Doctrine Note (Canadian Forces JDN)
highlights that in certain areas children “form the majority of forces.”8
In 2005, the United Nations’ Secretary-General identified six grave violations that
are committed against children. These violations are entrenched in the main legal
instruments in International Humanitarian Law (IHL), International Human Rights Law
(IHRL), and International Criminal Law (ICL), and they are listed as follows9:
1. Recruitment and use of children
2. Killing or maiming of children
3. Sexual violence against children
4. Attacks against schools or hospitals
5. Abduction of children

5

Gus Waschefort, International Law and Child Soldiers, (Oxford: Hart publishing, 2015) at 26-27;
Drumbl, supra note 3 at 27.
6
Ibid at 47; Prosecutor v Dominic Ongwen, ICC-02/04-01/15, Decision on the confirmation of charges
against Dominic Ongwen (23 March 2016), at para 142 (International Criminal Court, Pre-Trial Chamber
II), online: ICC <https://www.icc-cpi.int/courtrecords/CR2016_02331.PDF>. [Ongwen]
7
Francisco José Bernardino da Silva Leandro, “Generic guidelines for the use of force against “child
soldiers” in Peace Operations”, online: (2012) Revista Militar 2523,
<https://www.revistamilitar.pt/artigopdf/687>.
8
Canada, Minister of National Defence, Canadian Forces Joint Doctrine Note, 1st edition, (2017-01 Child
Soldiers) at 6, <http://dtic.mil/doctrine/notes/doctrine_notes.htm> [Canadian Forces JDN].
9
Office of the special Representative of the Secretary General for Children and Armed conflicts, The six
grave violations against children during armed conflict: the legal foundation, Working paper n°1,October
2009 (updated November 2013) at 9,
<http://www.tonyhoffmanucsc.net/caw_readings/SixGraveViolations.pdf> [Working paper updated 2013].
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6. Denial of humanitarian access.10
This MRP will focus on the first grave violation related to the prohibition against
the recruitment or use of children under fifteen to participate in hostilities. The analysis
around this violation will highlight a disconnect between the international discourse on the
prohibition against the recruitment and use of child soldiers and the continuing practice of
child soldiering. This MRP will stress some gaps that exist as to child soldiers’ legal
protection during armed conflicts under IHL and ICL, while pointing out to the potential
contribution of IHRL and military guidelines in the design of a stronger legal framework
on child soldiers.
Through a multidimensional analysis combining IHL, ICL and IHRL, this research
project will present two major arguments. First, it will argue that children under fifteen
years old enjoy a special status in international law that is visible both through the
established legal framework on the prohibition of children’s recruitment or use in hostilities
and through their specific status during armed conflicts, particularly their ‘special
protection’ under IHL. As it will be explained later, the special protection is an extended
protective legal regime that applies to a specific category of the population deemed
vulnerable during armed conflicts such as children under fifteen years and expectant
mothers.11

10

Ibid.
International Committee for the Red Cross, “special protection of women and children” (October 1985),
online:<https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/article/other/57jmj2.htm>; Protocol Additional to
the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International
Armed Conflicts, 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 3, art 77(3) [AP I]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed
Conflicts, 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 609, art 4(3) [AP II];Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War, 12 August 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, arts 23, 24, 38(5), 50)
(GCIV).
11
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Second, this MRP will highlight that neither the terms ‘direct’ nor ‘active’
participation (used respectively by IHL and ICL) properly capture the status of child
soldiers. This MRP will argue that child soldiers should neither be treated as regular
combatants or as civilians who are unlawfully participating in hostilities (unlawful
combatants). Rather, they should be considered as child victims whose participation to
hostilities is neither based “on free will aimed at a certain result” or “a conscious act of
engaging in conduct of a given nature.”12 In other words, this paper will argue that
children’s status during armed conflicts challenges the traditional IHL principle of
distinction and requires a new legal framework to better protect them.
This MRP will be structured into three main parts. The first part will explain some
basic and established principles in international law on children’s protection during armed
conflicts. First, it will discuss the definition of a child soldier and will situate the blanket
prohibition of children’s recruitment both in international law (hard law) and soft law. This
section will emphasize the scope and extent of the prohibition to recruit or use children in
hostilities and will conclude that such prohibition is not only widely entrenched in
international law, but most importantly, it has crystallised into customary international law
(CIL).
In the second part, this paper will lay out the underpinnings of children’s special
protection in IHL and will emphasize that such protection applies to all children under
fifteen years, regardless of their conduct or status in hostilities. To that extent, this MRP
will distinguish between ‘direct’ and ‘active’ participation in IHL’s and ICL’s legal
framework, while pointing out to inconsistencies and confusions in the understanding of

12

Leandro, supra note7 at 3.
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these terms. To explore these two notions, this project will explain and compare the
respective definitions adopted by the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC)
and the ICC. Then, a literature review will be conducted to compare the various
perspectives adopted by scholars in order to contrast and challenge the ICRC’s and the
ICC’s views on ‘active’ and ‘direct’ participation.
In the last part, this MRP will highlight the merits of a multidimensional framework
on the understanding of the scope of children’s protection during armed conflicts in
international law. In doing so, the project will point out some key principles from military
guidelines that armed groups and forces need to consider when there is a risk to encounter
child soldiers on the battlefield. In this section, the MRP will mainly rely on the Canadian
Forces Joint Doctrine (JDN). This section will also clarify that, although child soldiers may
be targeted when they constitute a threat for opposing force, the use of force (lethal or nonlethal) against them should always be the last option.

6

Chapter 1: Uncovering children’s special status during armed conflict
in international law

1. International legal framework on child soldiers
Initially designed as a mechanism to foster political relations between sovereign
states, public international law did not question, prohibit or codify the phenomenon of child
soldiering until 1977, despite the numerous evidence of such practice.13 Waschefort points
out that “there are many accounts in history, theology and mythology of children’s heroism
in battle”, and that despite the substantial number of children who were engaged in
hostilities during the Second World War, “the Geneva Conventions of 1949 did not prohibit
the recruitment and participation of children in armed conflict.”14 Therefore, in 1977, IHL
became the first area of international law that addressed the issue of child soldiers through
the first two Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions (AP I & II).15
1.1 Lack of an authoritative and binding definition of a child soldier
The issue of child soldiers is multifaceted and has been treated from various angles
by a plethora of actors. Waschefort notes that “at present there are at least eight
international treaties prohibiting the use and recruitment of child soldiers”, and that “the
obligations created by each of these treaties are different from one another.”16 In addition
to such diversity, he notes that “different states have ratified different combinations of these
treaties, further complicating the assessment of the exact nature of the legal obligations to

13

Waschefort, supra note 5 at 1.
Ibid.
15
AP I, supra note 11; AP II, supra note 11.
16
Wachefort, supra note 5 at 13
14
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which a state may be subject vis-à-vis a specific child in a concrete case.”17 For instance,
AP I and II have prohibited the recruitment or use of children under fifteen years18, whereas
the Optional Protocol to the CRC has raised the standard by prohibiting such practice for
all children under eighteen years.19 This lack of uniformity not only blurs states’ legal
obligations towards child soldiers, but it also hampers the development of a comprehensive
legal protection for children living in conflict zones.
In addition, despite its prohibition to recruit or use children in hostilities since 1977,
international law has never been able to codify an authoritative definition of a child
soldier.20 Eisentrager asserts that “the lack of laws and regulations prohibiting childsoldiering may have been a contributing factor to the recruitment and use of children in
armed conflict”, since “states have been very eager to secure their own interests, rather the
interests of underage individuals participating in hostilities.”21 Unsurprisingly, the absence
of an early established legal framework on the issue of child soldiers prevented the
subsequent development of a consistent definition and approach. This research project
posits that such a lacuna is problematic because it offers little protection to children while
failing to provide a complete and uniform legal basis to courts, states, armed groups and
advocates confronted with this issue at policy, decision-making or operational levels.

17

Waschefort, supra note 5 at 13-14.
AP I posits the possibility to recruit children who are fifteen years and older: “In recruiting among those
persons who have attained the age of fifteen years but who have not attained the age of eighteen years, the
Parties to the conflict shall endeavour to give priority to those who are oldest.” (API, supra note 11 art
77(2)).
19
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed
conflict, 25 May 2000, A/RES/54/263, arts 1 & 2 (entered into force 12 February 2002) [Optional Protocol
to the CRC].
20
The Canadian Forces JDN points out that “there is no consistent universally recognized definition of a
child soldier” (Canadian Forces JDN, supra note 8 at 1-3).
21
Stian Eisentrager, “Exploring the Recruitment and Use of Child Soldiers” (19 April 2012) online:
<http://www.e-ir.info/2012/04/19/exploring-the-recruitment-and-use-of-child-soldiers/>.
18
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Moreover, this project argues that since some actors may have adopted various and
conflicting positions with respect to children’s protection and participation in hostilities,
this complicates further developments of the law.
Despite the failure of international law to define what is a child soldier, soft law22
has provided some guidance on this concept by explicating the characteristics of a child
soldier and the roles or functions attributed to such position. As a matter of fact, the issue
on child soldiers started to become a major theme in international politics thanks to the
release of the ground-breaking report of Graça Machel in 1996.23 This report examined the
impact of armed conflicts on children in several countries affected by armed conflicts such
as Angola, Cambodia, Colombia, Northern Ireland, Lebanon, Sierra Leone, Rwanda and
some refugee camps in the former Zaire and Tanzania, and various locations in the former
Yugoslavia.24
In 1997, during an international conference held in South Africa on the “prevention
of child recruitment”, the Cape Town Principles were adopted.25 This conference was
aimed at developing “strategies for preventing recruitment of children, demobilising child
soldiers and helping them to reintegrate into society.”26 The Cape Town Principles clarified

Soft law refers to “the principles of a political, practical, humanitarian, or moral nature that can influence
state behaviour, but that do not, strictly speaking, correspond to extant legal obligations or rights” (John
Currie et al., International Law: Doctrine, Practice and Theory, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2014), at
151).
23
Graça Machel is the “first post-independence” Minister of Education of Mozambique. In 1993, she was
appointed by the former UN Secretary General Boutros-Boutros Gali as a UN expert to investigate the
conditions and the impact of children during armed conflicts which triggered increase attention on the issue
of child soldiering (UNICEF, “Impact of armed conflict on children” online:
<https://www.unicef.org/graca/graca.htm>.
24
Graça Machel Report, supra note 1 at 7.
25
UNICEF, Cape Town Principles, 27-30 October 1997,
<https://www.unicef.org/emerg/files/Cape_Town_Principles%281%29.pdf> [Cape Town Principles].
26
UNICEF, Paris Principles: Principles and guidelines associated with armed forces or armed groups,
February 2007, at 1.2 < https://www.unicef.org/emerg/files/ParisPrinciples310107English.pdf> [Paris
Principles].
22
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for the first time that a “child soldier” does not only refer to “a child who is carrying or has
carried arms, but also “any person under 18 years of age who is part of any kind of regular
or irregular armed force or armed group in any capacity, including but not limited to cooks,
porters, messengers and anyone accompanying such groups.”27 The Cape Town Principles
asserted that “girls recruited for sexual purposes and for forced marriage” are also covered
by the definition of child soldiers.28 Most importantly, this instrument posited that “child
soldiers retain their rights as children.”29 This constitutes an unprecedented recognition and
a clear confirmation that children’s participation to warfare does not eliminate their status
and the special protection that they are entitled to as children. Unsurprisingly, the Cape
Town Principles have informed and influenced the “development of international norms as
well as shifts in policy at the national, regional and international levels.”30
A decade later, a new instrument, the Paris Principles, were adopted in 2007 as
part of a global review of the Cape Town Principles.31 This instrument coined the term
“children associated with armed forces or armed groups”, which refers to “any person
below 18 years of age who is or who has been recruited or used by an armed force or armed
group in any capacity, including but not limited to children, boys and girls, used as fighters,
cooks, porters, messengers, spies or for sexual purposes.”32 This definition does not only
refer to a “child who is taking or has taken a direct part in hostilities” since it is aimed at
emphasizing the multiple ways in which children become involved in armed conflicts.33

27

Cape Town Principles, supra note 25 at annex.
Ibid.
29
Ibid at 7.
30
Paris Principles, supra note 26 at 1.2.
31
Ibid.
32
Ibid at 2.1.
33
Ibid.
28
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Unfortunately, the more public the issue on child soldiers became the narrower it
was treated.

34

As a matter of fact, child soldiers were often treated by media and

international politics as being only those serving at the frontlines, which dissimulated all
child soldiers assigned to indirect and often invisible support functions.35 Leibig points out
that the major drawback of such approach is that “the issue becomes oversimplified and
subgroups are marginalized.”36
This MRP agrees with the definitions posited by the Cape Town Principles and the
Paris Principles which are very similar and are based on the same foundations. Both
definitions have rightly clarified that the concept of child soldiers cannot only be limited
to military operations or to direct participation in hostilities because the roles played by
children during armed conflicts are diverse and intersecting. Although they are not legally
binding, both the Cape Town Principles and the Paris Principles have succeeded in their
delimitation of the complexity related to the issue of child soldiering.
By contrast, as it will be discussed in chapter 2, legal treaties such as AP I, AP II,
and the Rome Statute have focused on a specific kind of participation (direct or active
participation), thus creating a superficial and narrow distinction as to the status and legal
protection of children affected by armed conflicts. According to Waschefort, “the concept
of ‘child soldier’ can reasonably be interpreted as being broader than any of the relevant
treaty norms or customary rules in existence.”37 This assertion clearly warns against the
negative tendency of hard law to codify in a narrow perspective social phenomenon such

Abigail Leibig, “Girl Child Soldiers in Northern Uganda: Do Current Legal Frameworks Offer Sufficient
Protection?” online: (2005) 3:1 Northwestern Journal of International Human Rights 6
<http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1017&context=njihr>.
35
Ibid.
36
Leibig, supra note 34 at para 5.
37
Waschefort, supra note 5 at 15.
34
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as child soldiering. Therefore, the concept of child soldiers is still filled with confusions
despite the non-binding guidance from soft law.
In the next section, this MRP will highlight the difficulties raised by the narrow
approaches adopted by IHL and ICL as to the prohibition of children’s participation in
hostilities in international law.
1.2 The prohibition of children’s recruitment or use in hostilities
No discussion on the issue of child soldiers would be complete without an
introduction to the core principles of IHL on the conduct of hostilities. A clear
understanding of such principles will help grasp the problematic on the prohibition of
children’s recruitment or use in international law. In addition, such examination is
important because it allows, on the one hand, for an analysis of the law related to the
practice of recruiting or using children under a certain age and, on the other hand for
clarification of the legal considerations that should be afforded to the consequences derived
from this practice.
IHL is the first and only area of international law entirely designed around the
conduct of hostilities. It balances military necessity, which gives belligerents the freedom
to conduct hostilities in order to defeat the adversary, against the principle of humanity or
humane treatment, which imposes “certain limits on the means and methods of warfare,
and requires that those who have fallen into enemy hands be treated humanely at all time.”38
According to the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the principle of humane treatment is

Nils Melzer and Etienne Kuster, “International Humanitarian Law, A Comprehensive introduction”,
(ICRC, 2016) at 17-18, <http://icrcndresourcecentre.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/4231_002IHL_WEB_133.pdf >; Nils Melzer, “Interpretive guidance on the notion of Direct Participation in
hostilities in IHL”, (ICRC, 2009) at 11 <https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc-002-0990.pdf >.
[ICRC Interpretive Guidance].
38
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a “minimum yardstick” which expresses “elementary considerations of humanity that must
be regarded as binding in any armed conflict, regardless of treaty obligation.”39 However,
this principle applies only to “[p]ersons taking no active part in the hostilities, including
members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed ‘hors de
combat’.”40 This rule contained in all four Geneva Conventions constitutes “the basic
minimum standards of international humanitarian law applicable in conflict situations.”41
IHL’s balancing finds its justification through the cardinal principle of distinction
between combatants and civilians. This principle recognizes that civilians “enjoy immunity
from direct attack unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities”, whereas
combatants “have the privilege under the laws of war to use force offensively without the
threat of criminal liability”, as long as they respect IHL’s core principles. 42 Therefore, one
of IHL’s aims is “to shield those who are not directly participating in the conflict from its
effects”, while allowing belligerents to wage war and to use tactics that do not violate the
laws of war.43 As it will be illustrated later, this traditional principle of distinction between

39

Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United
States of America), [1986] ICJ Rep 14 at para 218; Melzer and Kuster supra note 28 at 256.
40
Common Article 3(1) to: Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, 12 August 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N. T.S. 31 [GC I]; Geneva
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of the
Armed Forces at Sea, 12 August 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N. T.S. 85 [GC II];; Geneva Convention
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 12 August 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N. T.S. 135 [GC III];
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 12 August 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [GC IV].
41
ICRC, “Non-International Armed conflict”, Unit for relations with Armed and Security Forces, (June
2002) at 5 <https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/law10_final.pdf>.
42
ICRC Interpretive Guidance, supra note 38 at 20; Charles P. Trumbull IV, “Re-thinking the principle of
proportionality” online: (2015) 55:3 Virginia Journal of International at 351
<http://www.vjil.org/assets/pdfs/vol55/VJIL_55.3_Trumbull_FINAL.pdf>.
43
Michael N. Schmitt, “The Principle of Discrimination in 21st Century Warfare”, online: (2014) 2:1 Yale
Human Rights and Development Journal (1999) at 145
<http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1010&context=yhrdlj>.
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combatants and civilians is challenged both by the special protection owed to children,
their lack of legal capacity and by their status under IHRL.
AP I and II were the first international legal instruments to prohibit the recruitment
or use of child soldiers in armed conflicts.44 AP I regulates international armed conflicts
(IACs), whereas AP II focuses on non-international armed conflicts (NIACs).45 Both
instruments proscribe in categorical terms the recruitment or use of children under 15 years
old by armed groups or armed forces as illustrated below:
Art 77 (3) AP 1
The Parties to the conflict shall take all feasible measures in order that children who have
not attained the age of fifteen years do not take a direct part in hostilities and, in particular,
they shall refrain from recruiting them into their armed forces. In recruiting among those
persons who have attained the age of fifteen years but who have not attained the age of
eighteen years, the Parties to the conflict shall endeavour to give priority to those who are
oldest.
Art 4 (3) AP 2
3. Children shall be provided with the care and aid they require, and in particular:
c) children who have not attained the age of fifteen years shall neither be recruited in the
armed forces or groups nor allowed to take part in hostilities.46[emphasis added]

These strict prohibitions have been extensively reproduced and developed in
several legal regimes of international law throughout times. For instance, IHRL has
respectively in 1989 and 1999, through the Convention on the rights of the child (CRC)
and the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACRWC), urged state
members to “take all feasible measures” (CRC) and “all necessary measures” (ACRWC)
to ensure that children under fifteen years old (CRC) and no children under eighteen years

Joshua Yuvaraj, “When does a child participate actively in hostilities under the Rome statute? Protecting
children from use in hostilities after Lubanga” online: (2016) 32:83 Utrecht Journal of International and
European Law at 71 <http://www.utrechtjournal.org/articles/10.5334/ujiel.321/galley/151/download/>.
45
AP I, supra note 11; AP II, supra note 11. IACs refers to hostilities between states, whereas NIACs are
characterized by hostilities between states on one side or non-state actors on both sides (Meltzer & Kuster,
supra note 8 at 53).
46
AP 1, supra note 11, art77 (3); AP2, supra note 11, art 4 (3).
44
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old (ACRWC) have been recruited or participated directly in hostilities.47 Moreover, in
2000, Optional Protocol to the CRC was adopted to raise the minimum age for recruitment
or participation in hostilities to18 years old.48 Similarly, in 1998 and 2002, ICL, through
the Rome Statute of International Criminal Court (Rome Statute) and the Statute for the
Special Court of Sierra Leone (SSCSL), declared that “conscripting or enlisting children
under the age of fifteen years […] or using them to participate actively in hostilities” was
a war crime and a serious violation of IHL.49
This research project argues that the lack of uniformity in the law as to the age limit
for the prohibition of children’s recruitment or use in hostilities (15 years vs 18 years) is
based on “societal constructs of age and corresponding social roles”, instead of being
grounded upon scientific and “psychiatric developmental data.”50 This MRP recognizes
that the fifteen years old cut-off is a superficial and arbitrary age-limit which should be at
least extended to 18 years to match the CRC’s default age of majority. Indeed, its Article
1 defines a child as “every human being below the age of eighteen unless under the law
applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier.51
However, even such delimitation would still constitute a controversial
determination in some societies such as African societies where “childhood does not
correspond to the globally accepted age limit of under-18 years, but is largely influenced

47

Convention on the rights of the child, 20 November 1989, A/RES/54/263, art 38 (entered into force 12
February 2002) [CRC]; African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, 11 June 1990,
CAB/LEG/24.9/49, art 22 (entered into force 2 September 1990) [ACRWC].
48
Optional Protocol to the CRC, supra note 19, arts 1-4.
49
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998, A/CONF.183/9 arts 8(2)(b)(xvii), (e)(vii)
[Rome Statute]; Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 16 January 2002, art 4(c) (entered into force
on 12 April 2002, pursuant Security Council resolution 1315 (2000) of 14 August 2000) [SSCSL].
50
Ibid at 49.
51
CRC, supra note 47, art 1.
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by traditional socio-cultural and even economic contexts.”52 Unfortunately, the discussion
on what constitutes the appropriate age limit for children’s participation is beyond the
scope of this MRP. Moreover, ICL and IHL, which are the main focus of this project have
both maintained the status quo for children’s protection at fifteen years, which justifies the
focus on children under fifteen years in this MRP.53
In 1999, the International Labour Organization (ILO) went a step further than the
previously mentioned instruments by positing in its Worst Forms of Child Labour
Convention (ILO N°182 ) that “forced or compulsory recruitment of children for use in
armed conflict” is a practice similar to slavery. 54 As it will be explained later, this
declaration constitutes a strong and unprecedented assertion in international law. To that
extent, this MRP reminds that slavery is a jus cogens norm in international law which refers
to peremptory norms that are “prohibited at all times, both in times of peace and during
armed conflicts, and against all persons, irrespective of any legal status.”55
The prohibition against slavery also features an erga omnes obligation which
triggers a legal interest from all states to protect.56 Therefore, comparing the practice of
child soldiering to both a jus cogens norm and an erga omnes obligation is highly indicative
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of the seriousness and severity of such crime in international law.57 The Worst Forms of
Child Labour Convention (ILO N°182) is a core treaty among ILO fundamental
instruments and is meant to address the ILO’s objectives on the effective abolition of child
labour.58
Interestingly, in 2004, the Special Court for Sierra Leone was asked in the
Prosecutor v Sam Hinga Norman to pinpoint the moment at which the prohibition against
children’s recruitment and use in hostilities became part of customary international law.59
The Court examined state practice and opinio juris relating to child recruitment, and
confirmed that “[p]rior to November 1996, the prohibition on child recruitment had […]
crystallised as customary international law.”60 This conclusion was supported, on the one
hand, by the numerous occurrences of domestic legislation which illustrated that “almost
all states prohibit (and have done so for a long time) the recruitment of children under the
age of 15.”61
Moreover, the Court examined the ratification of legal instruments prohibiting such
crimes, and concluded that the “widespread recognition and acceptance of the norm
prohibiting child recruitment in Additional Protocol II and the CRC provides compelling
evidence that the conventional norm entered customary international law well before

Alexandre Andrade Sampaio, Matthew McEvoy, “Little weapons of war: reasons for and consequences
of treating child soldiers as victims”, online : (2016) 63 :1 Netherlands International Law Review at 62-63
< https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s40802-016-0054-1>.
58
ILO, “the International Labour Organization’s Fundamental Conventions”, (2005) at 7, online:
<http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/--declaration/documents/publication/wcms_095895.pdf>.
59
Prosecutor v Sam Hinga Norman, SCSL-2004-14-AR72(E), Decision on Preliminary Motion Based on
Lack of Jurisdiction (Child Recruitment) (31 May 2004) at paras 17-23 (Special Court for Sierra Leone,
Appeals Chamber), <http://www.sierralii.org/sl/judgment/special-court/2004/18>.
60
Ibid at para 17.
61
Ibid at para 18.
57

17
1996.”62 Finally, the Court clarified that despite some variations in the wording of the
prohibitions articulated by AP I on IACs and AP II on NIACs, “children are protected by
the fundamental guarantees, regardless of whether there is an international or internal
conflict taking place.”63 This conclusion was reaffirmed in 2009 and in 2013 by the Office
of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict in
its Working Paper on the “The Six Grave Violations Against Children During Armed
Conflict.”64 Thus, since the prohibition of the recruitment or use of children under fifteen
years to participate in hostilities is widely entrenched in international law and has also
crystalized into customary international law, this MRP argues that it “can be enforced
against all parties to a conflict”, and that it is aimed at proscribing all kinds of children’s
participation in armed conflicts.65
1.3 Recognizing children’s vulnerabilities through the special protection
The Canadian Forces JDN on child soldiers highlights that “vulnerable populations
are those individuals or groups who have a greater probability than the population as a
whole of being harmed and experiencing an impaired quality of life because of social,
environmental, health or economic conditions or policies.”66 Kuper argues that children’s
vulnerability is visible through many signs of child soldiering. For instance, she notes that
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usually when children participate in armed conflicts, “they operate with little or no training
and are often fed with a diet of alcohol and drugs”67
Unsurprisingly, the Declaration of the rights of the child posited that “the child, by
reason of his physical and mental immaturity, needs special safeguards and care, including
appropriate legal protection.”68 Similarly, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
declared that “motherhood and childhood are entitled to special care and assistance.”69
Consequently, children have been placed in the most vulnerable category of the population,
and have been granted more legal protections than adults both in domestic and international
law as a result of their vulnerabilities, “particularly in time of armed conflict.”70 Therefore,
Kuper points out that children are entitled to a special treatment which grant them
“additional assistance and protection.”71 Similarly, Cohn and Goodwill-Gill support that
“in recognition of their particular needs and vulnerability, children benefit from specific
provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention, so-called special protection.”72
Interestingly, the ‘special protection’ is not only found in the GC IV but also in AP
I and II. The provisions of GC IV, which protect civilians “not taking active part in
hostilities”, relate mainly to children’s basic needs such as “the provision of food, clothing
and tonics, care of children who are orphaned or separated from their families, treatment
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during deprivation of liberty and the distribution of relief consignments.”73 Such protection
is in line with IHL’s principle of distinction, which is aimed at protecting those who are
not directly involved in hostilities from direct attacks.
However, this protection was extended to children who take a direct part in
hostilities through AP I and II. Indeed, AP I posits that children who take a direct part in
hostilities “shall continue to benefit from the special protection”, “whether or not they are
prisoners of war”, whereas AP II highlights that “the special protection […] remains
applicable” to children under fifteen years “if they take a direct part in hostilities […] and
are captured.”74 Therefore, under AP I belligerents are reminded that “children shall be the
object of special respect and shall be protected against any form of indecent assault”,
whereas AP II urges parties to provide children “with the care and aid they require.”75
Moreover, AP I emphasizes that when “arrested, detained or interned for reasons related to
the armed conflict”, these children “shall be held in quarters separate from the quarters of
adults.”76 Similarly, both AP I and II strictly prohibit the death penalty against any person
who was under 18 years at the time the offence was committed, even if this crime is related
to acts committed during the armed conflict.77
Extending the special protection to children who are directly participating in
hostilities is positively surprising and unexpected given IHL’s traditional perspective. As
mentioned earlier, IHL is based on the inherent distinction between actors who are
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participating in hostilities (combatants) and thus, who are not protected from direct attack,
and actors who are not participating in warfare (civilians) and, consequently who are
protected from such attacks.78 Both categories were traditionally kept distinct and separate
in terms of rights and obligations under IHL.79 Van Bueren supports that “the majority of
children become caught up in armed conflicts as civilians”, and that all of them they suffer
from direct and indirect consequences of war.80 Consequently, this research project posits
that such extended protection to child soldiers is justified.
Therefore, the fact that two distinct categories of actors under IHL (child civilians
and child direct participants in hostilities) benefit from the same protection stresses that
what they share (childhood, vulnerabilities, immaturity) is given more weight than what
sets them apart (their conduct or status in hostilities). This MRP argues that the special
protection granted to children under fifteen years refers to an exceptional and broad legal
regime aimed at offering the best legal protection to children whether they are participating
in hostilities or not.
Furthermore, this project states that such protection is based on children’s
acknowledged vulnerabilities, their legal incapacity and their lower maturity, instead of
being derived from their conduct (direct participation) or their status (combatant) in
hostilities. Unsurprisingly, such protection means that children’s presence on the battlefield
will justify the application of stricter rules of conduct and, as will be discussed in chapter 2,
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will require additional assessments from opposing armed forces or groups before any
attack.
Thus, it is clear that the principles contained in the special protection call for higher
standards of protection while advocating for a differentiated treatment towards children.
Moreover, the fact that the special protection does not explicitly protect child soldiers from
being targeted does not make the study of their legal protection irrelevant. Rather, the
understanding of this legal regime which applies to all children can help both lawmakers
and belligerents to adapt approach towards child soldiers.
Conclusion
This first chapter has presented the legal framework on child soldiers by
highlighting, on the one hand, a lack of an authoritative and binding definition for the term
‘child soldier’, while pointing out to some issues resulting from this gap in international
law. Moreover, this chapter has referred to the essential guidance provided by soft law
through three documents, namely the Graça Machel report, the Cape Town Principles and
the Paris Principles. These instruments clarified that a child soldier is not only a child who
is participating in military operations contrary to the narrow understanding of hard law
under IHL and ICL. Rather, soft law posited that a child soldier refers to a wide range of
roles and functions undertaken by children during hostilities for the advantage of armed
groups or forces.
After laying down the foundational elements of the term ‘child soldier’, this chapter
discussed the codification of the prohibition against the recruitment or use of children in
hostilities in several areas of international law. To that extent, this chapter illustrated that
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such prohibition has crystallized into customary international law and that it constitutes a
highly-prohibited act under international law.
Finally, chapter 1 concluded its analysis by paying a closer attention to the concept
of the special protection which has been granted to both children civilians and child
soldiers. This MRP argued that granting the same protection to child civilians and to
children who are involved in hostilities is a justifiable departure from the traditional IHL’s
principle of distinction since IHL has traditionally kept the rights and obligations of both
categories separate and somehow opposed. Such deviation is a clear sign from IHL that
calls for a special treatment for children who are affected by armed conflicts. Thus, as
mentioned earlier, the special protection, applies to all children under fifteen whether or
not they are participating in hostilities.
The next chapter will distinguish between ‘direct’ and ‘active’ participation through
a dialogue between IHL and ICL. This chapter will present and compare the conflicting
and narrow approaches adopted by the ICC and the ICRC.81 Moreover, these approaches
will be further explored through a literature review which will compare these approaches
with other positions adopted by scholars or courts as to the concepts of ‘direct’ or ‘active’
participation in hostilities. This chapter will argue that both the ICC and the ICRC have
failed to properly define the legal status of child soldiers by adopting ambiguous and
opposed approaches.
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A multidimensional analysis, which incorporates IHRL principles will be
conducted to highlight their potential contributions on the designing of an effective legal
framework on the protection of child soldiers.
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Chapter 2: Investigating a multidimensional scope for child soldiers’
legal protection

2. Combining IHL, ICL and IHRL
Adopting a multidimensional scope for the study of the legal protection of child
soldiers is not only necessary but also pressing because the problematic on child soldiering
cannot be effectively analyzed and remedied by only focusing on a single area of law. 82
Interestingly, Buck clarifies that “children’s rights can be properly understood only in the
context of the wider human rights framework.”83 Likewise, Waschefort notes that “today,
international human rights law (IHRL) and international criminal law (ICL) are as
important to the prohibition of child soldiering as IHL.”84 Furthermore, he posits that “in
taking an ‘issues-based approach’ to child soldier prevention, it is imperative not to view
the contribution of a single sub-regime of international law, such as IHL, in isolation.”85
In order to lay out a multidimensional legal framework of child soldiers’ legal
protection, it is important to know and understand “not only the contribution of regimes
such as IHL, IHRL and ICL to the problem at hand”, but also “the interaction of these
regimes.”86 Consequently, this section will define and distinguish between IHL, ICL and
IHRL by highlighting their commonalities and divergences, and by demonstrating their
potential contributions and impacts in the codification of the legal protection of child
soldiers.
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As mentioned in chapter 1, IHL is the legal regime that applies to the conduct of
hostilities between states or armed groups and is characterized by the core principle of
distinction.87 Unfortunately, this area of law has not been very proactive in the efforts to
develop strong principles aimed at eliminating the practice of child soldiering. Waschefort
notes that “legal development within IHL is rather stagnant”, whereas “associated fields of
international law” such as ICL and IHRL “have proven more agile.” 88 Consequently, it is
important to analyze these areas of law in order to better grasp what may be their respective
contributions to the legal protection of child soldiers.
ICL “aims to deter and prohibit certain categories of conduct and impose criminal
liability on individuals in retribution for such conduct.”89 Its purpose is to “create a
universal legal consciousness” on certain types of crimes which are considered as
inhumane, egregious or shocking for the humanity.90 In other words, ICL is focused on the
punishment of proscribed behaviours, and, its approach will be characterized by a broad
interpretation of prohibited conducts. Waschefort points out that “developments within
ICL are the most recent, and this branch of law is most active in relation to prohibiting
child soldiering.”91
However, it is worth noting that ICL and IHL, despite their different mandates, are
interconnected.92 To that extent, it is crucial to remember that war crimes prohibited by
ICL “are essentially IHL norms, the violation of which results in criminal responsibility on
the international plane.”93 As highlighted in chapter 1, the Rome Statute considers that
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conscripting, enlisting or using children under fifteen years old is a war crime and thus, a
serious violation of IHL.94
IHRL is a far-reaching legal regime which establishes some core human rights
norms. Such norms apply on states, both in times of peace and war, and are meant to protect
individuals “from the abuse of power by states.”95 Therefore, there are some human right
norms that can never be derogated from, regardless of whether there is an applicable lex
specialis regime such as IHL during armed conflicts.96 These rights or prohibitions include
“the right to life, prohibition of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment, prohibition of slavery and servitude and the prohibition of retroactive criminal
laws.”97 As highlighted earlier, the connection between child soldiers and the prohibition
against slavery is found in the ILO N°182.
This instrument posited that the forced or compulsory recruitment of children has
been identified by the ILO as a practice similar to slavery.98 According to Sampaio and
McEvoy, the ILO N°182 is a significant treaty both in international law and towards the
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issue of child soldiers because it “is binding on all UN Member States, even those few
which have yet to ratify.”99
Thus, while using a different lens, IHL and IHRL are complementary in their
protection of children during armed conflicts, through their aim “to protect the lives, health
and dignity of individuals.”100 The ICRC points out that, although “IHL and IHRL have
historically had a separate development, recent treaties include provisions from both bodies
of law” such as the CRC, the Optional Protocol to the CRC and the Rome Statute. It is not
a coincidence that all these instruments, which incorporate both IHL, ICL and IHRL norms,
have actively codified the prohibition against children’s recruitment and use in armed
conflicts, as developed in chapter 1. This MRP posits that such overlap should be aimed at
offering a strong and complementary legal framework for the protection of child soldiers,
instead of confusing the applicable threshold. Unfortunately, each of these areas has
designed their own standards and principles101 which has created “a gap […] in the
protective regime”, as noted by Drumbl.102
In the next section, this MRP will argue that both IHL and ICL, while based on
some valid and legitimate principles, may trigger contradictory effects towards children’s
protection during armed conflicts, especially due to their diverging standards and
applications of the concept of “direct” and /or “active” participation in hostilities.
2.1 “Direct” vs “active” participation under IHL and ICL
Both IHL and ICL have limited the scope of their prohibition to a specific kind of
participation in hostilities, whereas IHRL through soft law adopted a broader approach by
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prohibiting all kinds of children’s involvement (whether direct or active) in armed
conflict.103
As presented in chapter 1, soft law has not limited its definition of child soldiers to
their ‘direct’ or ‘active’ participation in military operations. Rather, it pointed out to the
variety of roles and functions undertaken by children in armed groups, ranging from
“cooks, messengers, spies” to sexual slaves.104 Such a broad delineation indicates that the
prohibition on the recruitment and use of child soldiers does not only refer to children who
are serving on the front lines of battlefield, but rather, any type of action that children
perform in order to advance the collective interest of an armed group or force, or the
personal interests of members of such group. This MRP asserts that such broad
demarcation is positive because it offers a full and stronger protection to child soldiers due
to its inclusiveness. In addition, such a large scope, represents an effective protection that
diverges from the superficial and flawed distinction derived from the ‘active’ and ‘direct’
participation, as it will be presented in this section.
The best way to illustrate IHL’s and ICL’s approach is to reproduce the relevant
provisions of AP I, II and the Rome Statute:
AP I - Article 77 — Protection of children
1. The Parties to the conflict shall take all feasible measures in order that children who have
not attained the age of fifteen years do not take a direct part in hostilities and, in particular,
they shall refrain from recruiting them into their armed forces. […]
AP II - Article 4 — Fundamental guarantees
2. Children shall be provided with the care and aid they require, and in particular:
c) children who have not attained the age of fifteen years shall neither be recruited in the
armed forces or groups nor allowed to take part in hostilities;
Soft Law’s approach is reflected in the broad definitions of child soldiers in the Cape Town Principles
and the Paris Principles. Both definitions were presented in this MRP, in chapter 1.
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d) the special protection provided by this Article to children who have not attained the age
of fifteen years shall remain applicable to them if they take a direct part in hostilities despite
the provisions of sub-paragraph c) and are captured105;

Rome Statute - Article 8 — War crimes
For the purpose of this Statute, ‘war crimes’ means:
(b) […]
(xxvi) Conscripting or enlisting children under the age of fifteen years into the
national armed forces or using them to participate actively in hostilities.
(e) […]
(vii) Conscripting or enlisting children under the age of fifteen years into armed
forces or groups or using them to participate actively in hostilities; […].106
[emphasis added]

It is clear that the prohibition against children’s participation has to satisfy the
threshold of either ‘direct’ or ‘active’ participation in order to be considered as a violation
of IHL or ICL. This requirement from hard law is distinct from the broader scope of soft
law, as described earlier. Under IHL, ‘active’ and ‘direct’ participation have been
interpreted as synonymous terms, whereas ICL has interpreted them as distinct concepts
and applied them differently.107
This section will present and analyse the approaches adopted by IHL and ICL as to
both terms, before comparing them to the positions of other scholars in the literature
review.
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2.1.1

‘Direct’ participation in hostilities under IHL

Under IHL, the concept of “direct participation in hostilities” (DPH) stems from
the principle of distinction and has been adopted to grant protection to civilians.108 Schmitt
posits that “one of the seminal purposes of the law is to make possible a clear distinction
between civilians and combatants.”109 Accordingly, during armed conflicts, belligerents
have to distinguish between civilians who cannot be targeted, and combatants who are
subject to attacks. Moreover, IHL recognizes that the protection of civilians from direct
attack will cease “for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities.”110
Nevertheless, IHL has never explicitly defined what constitutes ‘direct’
participation. To clarify this concept, the ICRC published in 2009 the Interpretive
Guidance On The Notion of Direct Participation Under International Humanitarian Law
(ICRC Interpretive Guidance), which developed three constitutive elements for the finding
of direct participation in hostilities (DPH). The ICRC emphasized that the notion of direct
participation in hostilities is composed of two elements: that of “hostilities”, which “refers
to the (collective) resort by the parties to the conflict to means and methods of injuring the
enemy”, and that of “direct participation” which captures the “(individual) involvement of
a person in these hostilities.”111
This MRP will present the three constitutive elements and will closely examine the
third element by highlighting its inadequacy and inapplicability as to the specific context
of child soldiers. First of all, the ICRC Interpretive Guidance stated that “the notion of
direct participation in hostilities does not refer to a person’s status, function or affiliation,
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but to his or her engagement in specific hostile acts.”112 In other words, DPH refers to
specific acts or conduct, whether they are “spontaneous, sporadic, or unorganized” or even
when they are regular acts derived from a continuous combat function.113 Accordingly, it
is not the status but the conduct that determines if someone is directly participating in
hostilities. Unsurprisingly, the ICRC asserts that “under IHL, the concept of direct
participation in hostilities refers to conduct which, if carried out by civilians suspend their
protection against the dangers arising from military operations.”114
Therefore, the ICRC has established that in order for an act to qualify as a DPH,
three conditions must be met cumulatively. First of all, “the act must be likely to adversely
affect the military operations or military capacity of a party to an armed conflict, or
alternatively, to inflict death, injury, or destruction on persons or objects protected against
direct attack.”115 In other words, the act must “reasonably be expected to cause harm of a
specifically military nature, or “in the absence of such military harm” the act must be likely
“to cause at least death, injury, or destruction.”116
Secondly, there must be “a direct causal link between the act and the harm likely to
result either from that act or from a coordinated military operation of which that act
constitutes an integral part”.117 This second condition focuses on the proximity between
the act and the harm expected. As a matter of fact, the ICRC emphasizes that “the concept
of direct participation in hostilities is restricted to specific acts that are so closely related to
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the hostilities conducted between parties to an armed conflict that they constitute an
integral part of those hostilities.”118
Finally, to satisfy the last condition which is the belligerent nexus, it has to be
demonstrated that the act was “specifically designed to directly cause the required
threshold of harm in support of a party to the conflict and to the detriment of another.” 119
The ICRC highlighted that if the act was not specifically designed in support of a party to
an armed conflict and to the detriment of another, such act “cannot amount to any form of
“participation” in hostilities taking place between these parties.”120 Furthermore, the ICRC
has emphasized that the belligerent nexus “should be distinguished from concepts such as
subjective intent and hostile intent”, since both notions “relate to the state of mind of the
person concerned, whereas belligerent nexus relates to the objective purpose of the act.121
The ICRC emphasizes that such “purpose is expressed in the design of the act or operation
and does not depend on the mindset of every participating individual.”122
However, how can a certain act be “specifically designed” to support a party to the
conflict without involving subjectivity and intent? The ICRC’s position is even harder to
defend after comparing several definitions of the verb “to design” as illustrated below:
To conceive and plan out in the mind.123
Do or plan (something) with a specific purpose in mind.124
To decide how something will be made, including how it will work and what it
will look like, and often to make drawings of it.125 [emphasis added]

118

Ibid at 58.
Ibid.
120
Ibid at 59.
121
Ibid.
122
Ibid.
123
Merriam-Webster dictionary, sub verbo “to design” <https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/design >.
124
The Oxford English Dictionary, sub verbo “to design”,
<https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/design>.
125
Macmillan Dictionary, sub verbo “to design”,
<http://www.macmillandictionary.com/dictionary/british/design_2> .
119

33
Therefore, “designing something” clearly involves subjectivity and intent of
someone in the planning of an action. Such act can only be conducted by a commander or
a chief who has some power or authority to plan military operations. Furthermore, adding
the adjective “specifically” to the verb “to design” reinforces the necessity to demonstrate
a certain degree of someone’s personal decision, commitment and involvement in the
planning and conduct of an action. Although the ICRC admitted that in exceptional
circumstances the mental state or the intent of an individual will be taken into
consideration, such concession is still not enough to account for the meaning behind the
belligerent nexus.126
In the next sections, this MRP will argue that intent is an important element that
has to be considered in the assessment of DPH and that, children’s incapacity to form an
intent to DPH negates their ability to be considered as combatants who are directly
participating in hostilities and who can be targeted.127 As a matter of fact, Sampaio and
McEvoy support that “international law […] calls for young children and those aged 15
and above to be regarded as devoid of intent and unaware of their role in the conduct of
hostilities.”128 Consequently, both authors argue that “children cannot be considered
legally capable of directly participating in conflicts.”129 This MRP argues that any targeting
of child soldiers is illegal, even if the use of force against them is possible and accepted
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when child soldiers are used as frontlines and constitute a threat for opposing armed
forces.130
2.1.2

‘Active’ participation under ICL

Both the Rome Statute and the SSCSL prohibit three specific actions related to
children’s involvement in hostilities: their conscription, their enlistment and their use for
active participation in hostilities.131 After clarifying the distinction between those three
terms, this section will focus on the last concept related to children’s use for ‘active’
participation.
In the Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, the Trial Chamber highlighted that
conscripting, enlisting and using children for DPH constitutes three “separate offences”
which can be charged separately or cumulatively.132 To reach this conclusion, the Chamber
analyzed each of the three offences and pointed out that a child can be “used” to participate
actively in hostilities “without evidence being provided with respect to his or her earlier
“conscription” or “enlistment” into the relevant armed force or group.” 133 Therefore, the
Chamber posited that ‘enlisting’ refers to the act of “enrol[ing] on the list of a military
body”, whereas “conscripting” is defined as “to enlist compulsorily.”134
Consequently, the distinction between these two actions is found in the “added
element of compulsion” of the term “conscription.”135 Sivakumaran warns against a narrow
interpretation of both terms and notes that “conscription” and “enlistment” are both
different ways to unlawfully recruit children.136
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As for children’s use for ‘active participation’, the Chamber noted that the Rome
Statute drafters adopted the expression ‘using’ children to ‘participate actively in
hostilities’ “in order to cover both direct participation in combat and also active
participation in military activities.”137 Therefore, the Trial Chamber posited that “the use
of the expression ‘to participate actively in hostilities’, as opposed to the expression ‘direct
participation’ (as found in Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions) was clearly
intended to import a wide interpretation to the activities and roles that are covered by the
offence of using children under the age of 15 actively to participate in hostilities.”138
As a result, the Trial Chamber concluded that ‘active’ participation covers both
‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ participation, and that “the decisive factor […] in deciding if an
“indirect” role is to be treated as active participation in hostilities is whether the support
provided by the child to the combatants exposed him or her to real danger as a potential
target.”139 Therefore, the Chamber acknowledged that “those who participate actively in
hostilities include a wide range of individuals, from those on the front line (who participate
directly) through to the boys or girls who are involved in a myriad of roles that support the
combatants.”140 Accordingly, to determine whether a specific role qualifies as active
participation, it must be proven that “the child concerned is, at the very least, a potential
target.”141
Such interpretation has been criticized because it extended “the scope of persons
who may be legitimately targeted by an adverse party.”142 Sivakumaran emphasized that

137

Lubanga, supra note 105 at para 621.
Ibid at para 627.
139
Ibid at para 628.
140
Ibid.
141
Ibid.
142
Yuvaraj supra note 44 at 79.
138

36
the ICC’s approach is problematic because it does not provide any guidance as to what
constitute a ‘real danger’ or a ‘potential target.’143 His position and other similar positions
of scholars will be developed in the literature review to demonstrate the extent to which
the ICC’s approach is ambiguous and unhelpful for children’s protection in armed
conflicts.
Unsurprisingly, both IHL and ICL encapsulate important norms on the prohibition
of child soldiers. Nevertheless, analyzing the issue on child soldiers using only one of these
approaches can be limiting and narrow without paying a closer attention to soft law and
human rights instruments. The next section will explore the literature to highlight how the
ICRC’s and the ICC’s tests have been received, contrasted, or confirmed in international
law through the use of IHL, ICL and IHRL. This part will aim to highlight the strength and
limitations of the arguments posited by scholars about the scope of active and direct
participation, while highlighting the advantages to including IHRL in the discussions
related to the prohibition of the practice of child soldiering.
2.2 Literature review
Much has been written on the terms ‘active’ and ‘direct’ participation in the
literature. However, so far, a consensus on the meaning of both terms has not been reached,
except a redundant observation from scholars on the ambiguity of either one or these terms
as it will be discussed in this section. This MRP has selected articles and book chapters
which have closely examined the nature of the prohibition against civilians’ direct
participation and children’s participation in hostilities. Some authors such as Sivakumaran,
Sampaio and McEvoy have aligned with, contrasted or rejected the ICRC’s guidance on
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the notion of DPH, while others such as Wagner and Yuvaraj have investigated the ICC’s
definition of ‘active’ participation and evidenced its weaknesses or positive inputs.
Through a dialogue between scholars, this literature review will investigate whether
chid soldiers would be better protected by a broad or narrow scope of the prohibition
against children’s ‘direct’ or ‘active’ participation. In other words, this section will
examine the pros and cons of using an extensive or narrow codification of children’s
participation in armed conflicts by highlighting its advantages and drawbacks for children’s
protection. To support is findings, this literature review will distinguish between two main
approaches: the conservative approach, which focuses on IHL principles and adopts a onesided analysis, and the multidimensional approach, which goes beyond the mere principles
of IHL and ICL by bring some notions of IHRL.
2.2.1

Conservative approach

This approach is supported by Schmitt, Naqvi, Bianchi and Wagner, and is
characterized by its essential focus on IHL’s traditional principles, and by its radical
rejection of human rights principles when dealing with the finding of ‘direct’ participation.
In his article entitled “Humanitarian Law and Direct Participation in Hostilities by
Private Contractors or Civilian Employees”, Michael Schmitt examines the scope of the
various roles undertaken by government civilian employees or private contractors in the
war in Iraq.144 He notes that such participation is highly problematic due to their lack of
accountability in the case of misconduct.145 He concludes that government employees or
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private contractors do not satisfy the threshold to become lawful combatants under IHL.146
This analysis is relevant in the context of civilians undertaking roles that are traditionally
reserved for combatants such as child soldiers who are illegally deployed on the battlefield.
Nevertheless, Schmitt asserts that, despite the lack of a lawful status as a combatant,
“a civilian who participates in hostilities remains a valid military objective until
unambiguously opting out through extended nonparticipation or an affirmative act of
withdrawal.”147 While interesting, this alternative constitutes a risky exercise for the
unlawful combatant because he or she will continue to assume the risk of being targeted,
particularly in the case where “the other side is unaware of such withdrawal”, as pointed
out by Schmitt himself.148 Similarly, Sivakumaran rightly notes that this approach “suffers
from the evidential difficulty that would be required for such a showing.”149
To assess civilians’ participation in hostilities, Schmitt argues that, there has to be
a “but for” causation, which evidences the connexion between the act and its consequences,
a “causal proximity” as to the ensuing consequence, and, “a mens rea of intent.”150 Based
on this framework, it is clear that child soldiers under 15 would not qualify as military
objective due to their recognized lack of intent.151 As a matter of fact, McEvoy and
Sampaio claimed that “children are, irrespective of their age, too immature to choose to
perform such a hazardous occupation as directly participating in an armed conflict.”152
Both authors also support the idea that child soldiers lack the necessary intent to be
considered as combatants who can be legitimately targeted. In addition, Schmitt supports
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a liberal interpretation of the notion of ‘direct participation’ and emphasizes that such
finding should occur even in case of doubt on whether civilians’ actions amount to direct
participation in hostilities.153 He declares that “the methodology that best approximates the
underlying intent of the direct participation notion is to interpret the term liberally, in other
words in favor of finding direct participation.”154 He justifies this position by the fact that
IHL requests belligerents to distinguish themselves from civilian population at all times.155
Finally, he argues that “while broadly interpreting the activities that subject
civilians to attack might seem counterintuitive from a humanitarian perspective, it actually
enhances the protection of the civilian population as a whole by encouraging distance from
hostile operations.”156
However, Schmitt’s interpretation is not supported by IHL. Articles 50 and 51(3)
of AP I stipulate the opposite. Article 50 declares that “in case of doubt whether a person
is a civilian, that person shall be considered to be a civilian.” 157 Similarly, Article 51(3)
posits that “in case of doubt whether an object which is normally dedicated to civilian
purposes, such as a place of worship, a house or other dwelling or a school, is being used
to make an effective contribution to military action, it shall be presumed not to be so
used.”158 Thus, it is clear that IHL’s priority remains the protection of civilian from military
operations. Consequently, in all cases of uncertainty as to the status of an individual, IHL
supports that his or her civilian status shall be presumed. The preservation of this status is
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important because it will grant a protection from unlawful targeting. 159 This MRP argues
that this important principle should be enforced even more vigorously in the specific case
of child soldiers. As a matter of fact, Schmitt’s claim is also flawed if applied in the specific
context of children’s participation where more protections have been granted or
recognized.
In the same vein as Schmitt, Bianchi and Naqvi seek to clarify the applicable law
that governs the conduct of hostilities by exploring the concept of direct participation in
the specific context of terrorism and counter-terrorism.160 Bianchi and Naqvi highlight that
the “exact scope of the notion of direct participation in hostilities remains a question of
controversy” in the literature due to the fact that such term has been traditionally interpreted
as only referring to hostile acts directed against enemy forces. Both authors regret that DPH
has never been considered as also referring to hostile acts against civilians. 161 Naqvi and
Bianchi note that according to this narrow interpretation of DPH, “a terrorist attack against
civilians, which did not harm the personnel or equipment of the enemy forces, would not
be considered direct participation in hostilities”, unless it is concluded that the civilian
population is a “center of gravity” in asymmetrical warfare, and a valid target that enables
the achievement of victory or the disadvantage of enemy forces.162
Interestingly, based on the finding of the necessity to have a “causal relationship
between the act and its immediate consequences”, Naqvi and Bianchi note that “mere
membership of a terrorist organization would not suffice to render a person liable to
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attack”, unless the person engage in “an act that by its nature or purpose was likely to cause
real damage to enemy forces.”163 This MRP supports that even in the context of terrorism,
international law should not allow the targeting of child soldiers based on their status or
conduct, unless they constitute a threat as it will be presented in chapter 3.
However, contrary to the ICRC guidance on the notion of DPH, Schmitt, Bianchi
and Naqvi did not address the issue of intent which, in the case of the issue on child soldiers
is crucial because it constitutes a major argument against the finding of their DPH.164
Therefore, it is unclear whether both authors would consider the participation of children
in terrorist activities as amounting to direct participation in the case where there is enough
proximity between their acts and consequences, despite the absence of children’s intent. In
addition, it is uncertain whether both authors would align with Schmitt’s proposition
related to the finding of DPH in case of doubt as to the nature of the act committed by the
civilian.
In her article entitled “a critical assessment of using children to participate actively
in hostilities in Lubanga: child soldiers and direct participation”, Wagner focuses her
analysis on the letter of the law.165 She examines the findings of the Trial Chamber in the
Lubanga case, particularly the one related to the distinction between ‘active’ and ‘direct’
participation. Wagner posits that “the meaning of active participation in hostilities under
sub-paragraph 8(2)(b)(xxvi) and (e)(vii) is not ambiguous or obscure, but is the same as
that of direct participation in hostilities under international humanitarian law.” 166 She
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affirms that the trial chamber in Lubanga has introduced a superficial distinction between
‘active’ and ‘direct’ participation that is not supported by the letter of the law.167
To demonstrate her reasoning, Wagner highlights that the absence of the term
“direct” under article 4(3)(c) of APII should have not been given much weight by the
court.168 Accordingly, she posits that “article 4 of APII, sub-paragraph 3(c), when read in
conjunction with sub-paragraph 3(d) appears to prohibit the direct participation of children
under the age of 15 in hostilities.”169 Therefore, Wagner argues that the omission of the
term ‘direct’ or ‘active’ “in a certain part of an article should not be taken to mean that the
prohibition is one other than direct.”170 Accordingly, she argues that the law has only
prohibited the ‘direct’ participation of children in both provisions.
Moreover, she emphasizes that “any difference in the text of article 77(2) of AP I
and article 4(3)(c) of AP II, is in fact, negligible.”171 She refers to Professor Doswald-Beck
who asserted that “not much should be read into this difference”, since “the final version
of the text of Protocol II was a simpler version of Protocol I presented in the last days of
the conference without extensive discussion.”172 However, such argumentation is
misleading insofar as it juxtaposes the ordinary meaning of a term against the context of
its codification. Brantingham and Solomon posit that “all solid treaty interpretation begins
with the words of a provision itself, as they are commonly understood”, and that the
contextual interpretation of a treaty has been relegated to a secondary position. 173 Thus,
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one may refer to contextual meaning “only where the text is ‘ambiguous or obscure,’ or
when the plain meaning of the text leads to a “manifestly absurd or unreasonable” result.174
None of the above supports Wagner’s claim. Thus, it seems legitimate to assert that the
lack of the term ‘direct’ in article 4(3)(c) may reflect a larger protection under AP II
contrary to AP I, as argued by the Lubanga case, Sivakumaran and Yuvaraj.175
After presenting the three constitutive elements of DPH from the ICRC’s
Interpretive Guidance, Wagner posits that these elements highlight a key difference
between “participation in the war effort” and “participation in hostilities.”176 She points out
that “active participation in the war effort (e.g., civilians who supply food to the army or
other such war sustaining activities) does not itself constitute participation in hostilities.”177
Therefore, “in order for preparatory activities to fall within the scope of direct participation,
such activities must be of a “specifically military nature and so closely linked to the
subsequent execution of a specific hostile act that they already constitute an integral part
of that act.”178
Accordingly, “preparatory activities that are merely designed to “establish general
capacity to carry out unspecified hostile acts”, including general training, for example, do
not fall within the scope of direct participation in hostilities.”179 Wagner points out that the
prohibition related to participation in hostilities is only focused on the ‘direct’ participation
and does not include “indirect acts of participation by children such as gathering and
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transmission of military information, transportation of arms and munitions, provisions of
supplies, etc.”180
Wagner emphasizes that the broad definition of “active participation” in Lubanga
“risks reducing the protection for children and for civilians in general” because it allows
more activities to be considered as hostile acts, which justifies their targetability.181 The
author points out that under IHL and ICL there was a consistent interpretation of ‘direct’
as being synonymous to ‘active’ participation, contrary to the findings of Lubanga.182 Put
simply, Wagner argues that “those not directly participating cannot be targeted and thus,
cannot be potential targets.”183
This position seems to be aimed at protecting child soldiers who perform support
functions or who are used to participate indirectly in hostilities. However, such
understanding is problematic because it does not criminalize the indirect use of children
who are also exposed to violence and abuse despite their absence or visibility from the
battlefield.184 Van Bueren insists that children’s indirect participation is equivalent to
“specific forms of exploitation”, which justifies the prohibition of all kinds of children’s
participation in armed conflicts.185 She also points out that during the codification of the
CRC, the “ICRC has opposed the insertion of the word “direct” because it would appear to
exclude indirect acts of participation which are capable of being as life-threatening and
dangerous as direct combat.”186 Leibig points out that “the focus on children serving in
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combat positions overshadows the experiences of many children who are abducted or
recruited into armed forces and then forced into serving as domestic and sexual slaves.”187
Therefore, it is clear that to protect effectively children from being recruited or used
in armed conflicts, the law has to set a blanket prohibition against all types of children’s
participation, and such prohibition must not distinguish between ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ acts
of participation.188 This MRP argues that international law needs to reach a consensus on
such a blanket prohibition to offer an exhaustive and stronger protection to children
affected by armed conflicts.
2.2.2

Multidimensional approach

This approach is advocated by Sivakumaran, Yuvaraj, Sampaio and McEvoy and
is aimed at establishing a dialogue between various areas of international law such as IHL,
ICL and IHRL.
Sivakumaran investigates the rules and principles related to the protection of
civilians and Person Hors de Combat which incorporates the principle of nondiscrimination and certain prohibitions against physical and psychological abuses.189
Sivakumaran examines specific categories of individuals who benefit from particular
protections such as the wounded, sick and shipwreck, the medical and religious personnel,
the interned and detained persons, children or child soldiers. With respect to the protection
of child soldiers, Sivakumaran points out to the wider prohibition of AP II and asserts that
“the customary prohibition is on all forms of [children’s] participation in hostilities”, at
least for NIACs, whereas uncertainty persists as to the scope of the prohibition for IACs.190
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Yuvaraj disagrees and argues that children enjoy the same protection both under IACs and
NIACs.191
Moreover, the author notes that, although some statutes such as the Rome Statute
have undermined the “existing standards” by adopting “the weaker prohibition” of ‘active
participation’, “states that are parties to both Additional Protocol II and the Convention on
the Rights of the Child remain subject to the stricter standards of the Protocol”, which
proscribes both the recruitment and the participation of children under fifteen in
hostilities.192
Sivakumaran regrets the limited scope adopted by IHL’s and ICL’s prohibitions,
which are respectively focused on the ‘direct’ and ‘active’ participation. According to the
author, such terms are problematic because they raise “difficulty in drawing a distinction
between acts that constitute direct or active participation in hostilities and those that do
not.”193 This MRP agrees with Sivakumaran’s point as to the lack of clarity and
effectiveness since both terms are still controversial or ambiguous.
Moreover, Sivakumaran rejects as Wagner does the broad interpretation of ‘active’
participation from the Lubanga judgement and emphasizes the lack of clarity of the
threshold adopted by the ICC. As a matter of fact, he argues that the ICC’s approach
“suggests that certain activities at a certain point in time would not amount to active
participation in hostilities as the child is not exposed to danger as a potential target, but the
same activities at a different point in time may well amount to active participation.”194 This
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is due to the fact that the court did not clarify what kind of danger is a real danger for a
child. Does the danger only refer to situation where the child can be killed, recognised by
enemy forces or kidnapped and used by armed groups? What about the danger faced by
child soldiers who have been or are at risk of being sexually abused by their own groups
as highlighted by the Ntaganda case195?
According to Sivakumaran, the ICC’s position is unclear and ambiguous because
“by the time it is realized that the child may be in real danger, it may well be too late.” 196
Moreover, the Lubanga case seems to have acknowledged the confusion of its approach by
stating that a case-by-case analysis should be conducted every time to determine if ‘active’
participation happened.197 Contrary to the ICC, Sivakumaran clarified that such case-bycase determination should only be reserved for grey areas.198 This is due to the fact that
such individualized assessment may prove perilous and uncertain for child soldiers as it
“may be subject to varying viewpoints”, while triggering “a dramatic effect upon the
conclusion with regard to the legality of a particular target.”199
Dissenting Judge Benito claimed that refusing “to enter a comprehensive legal
definition of a crime” by leaving it “open to a case-by-case analysis or to the limited scope
of the charges brought against the accused” is failing to protect the life and integrity of
child soldiers, while constituting a “step backwards in the progressive development of
international law.”200 This position is also shared by Sivakumaran who supports the
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establishment of a general framework of protection which would allow some exceptions or
further analysis in case of unclear or ambiguous situation.201
In addition, Sivakumaran points out that in the case that they do not reach the
threshold of ‘active participation’, “many of these activities would, however fall within the
notion of [direct] participation in hostilities and would thus be prohibited under the law of
non-international armed conflict.”202 This nuance clearly shows that Sivakumaran does not
automatically equate ‘direct’ participation to ‘active’ participation since he sees in the latter
concept a default regime which can be used as a catch-all category.
Therefore, this MRP argues that more effort should be focused on the creation of
a clear and operational framework of analysis which would encompass both ‘direct’ and
‘indirect’ participation. Unfortunately, Sivakumaran does not clarify if he would opt for
another definition of ‘active participation’ as an alternative to the ICC’s broad
interpretation nor did he provide elements to distinguish between ‘active’ and ‘direct’
participation. Moreover, it remains unclear whether Sivakumaran considers child soldiers
who are participating in hostilities as combatants, unlawful combatants or civilians.
Yuvaraj investigates the scope of children’s activities which amount to ‘direct’ or
‘active’ participation in hostilities under IHL and ICL. The author examines the terms
‘direct’ and ‘active’ under the Additional Protocols, the CRC and the Lubanga case. As
highlighted by Sivakumaran, Yuvaraj notes that, under AP II, there is a blanket prohibition
against all kinds of children’s participation in hostilities, contrary to AP I which only
prohibits children’s “direct” participation.203 In addition, Yuvaraj notes that “the degree of
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this difference is unclear given the lack of certainty of the scope of activities covered by
“direct” in article 77(2) of AP I.”204 Furthermore, he examines article 38 of the CRC on the
prohibition of children’s participation in hostilities and notes the use of the same wording
as in AP I.205 Interestingly, Yuvaraj points out that “it was felt that [this] provision could
undermine IHL because it was inconsistent with the level of protection offered in article
4(3) of APII.”206 Yuvaraj agrees with Sivakumaran by emphasizing that the term “direct”
should not have been incorporated in article 38 of the CRC “because it allows children to
be used to indirectly participate in hostilities.”207 He suspects that this incorporation was
due to the lack of a consensus on the necessity to adopt a blanket prohibition against
children’s participation (direct and indirect participation) among the CRC’s drafters.208
In addition, Yuvaraj points out that the criticisms of the Lubanga case result mainly
from the fact the court made children more targetable by recognizing that ‘active’
participation encompasses both ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ participation.209 To address these
criticisms, Yuvaraj points out that the ICC should clarify the scope of the term “active”
towards IHL and IHRL to avoid any overlap or confusions.210 Thus, Yuvaraj claims that
the use of the term “active” in the Rome Statute is strictly to be understood in the specific
context related to the protection of children’s recruitment and use, whereas the term
“direct” is a generic term used by IHL in order to achieve its core principle of distinction.211
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Consequently, Yuvaraj asserts that “the interpretation of ‘active’ for the purpose of
protecting children is likely not to affect the interpretation of ‘active’ or ‘direct’ for the
purpose of distinguishing between combatants and civilians.”212 Yuvaraj’s position is in
harmony with Sampaio’s and McEvoy’s arguments on the necessity to distinguish the
concepts of “direct” in IHL and “active” in ICL.
Indeed, in their article entitled “Little Weapons of War: Reasons for and
Consequences of Treating Child Soldiers as Victims”, Sampaio and McEvoy investigate
the legal framework on children’s protection in international law. 213 They assert that both
‘active’ and ‘direct’ participation have distinct purposes and thresholds, which justifies the
necessity to contextualize each of these terms. The authors support that “the purpose of
‘direct participation in hostilities’, is normally to serve as a pillar to the principle of
distinction, which protects victims of armed conflicts while determining that only
combatants can be lawfully targeted.”214 They claim, on the one hand that “direct
participation in hostilities is, therefore, usually a concept that is used for the protection of
civilians, limiting the conduct of belligerent parties vis-à-vis their targeting operations.”215
On the other hand, the authors support that “the concept of direct participation in conflicts,
when used in relation to children, does not have any connection with the principle of
distinction.”216
To reach this conclusion, Sampaio and McEvoy examine several provisions such
as Articles 77(2) in AP1, 4(3) c) and 38(2) in the CRC. They observe that in all these
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provisions, the law not only prohibit children’s recruitment and participation in hostilities,
but also puts the burden on states, armed groups and any other actor who may be involved
in the involvement of children in hostilities.217 According to the authors, such language
clearly demonstrates that “the international community has utilized the words “direct
participation in hostilities” in multiple instruments in relation to children solely to make it
illegal for belligerent forces to use children in combat rather than aiming to establish the
circumstances when children can be targeted in accordance with the principle of
distinction.”218
In addition, the authors examined art 51(3) which posits that “civilians shall enjoy
the protection afforded by this Section, unless and for such time as they take a direct part
in hostilities.”219 Sampaio and McEvoy notice that in this provision there is no burden put
on belligerents to ensure the absence of civilians from the battlefield, contrary to the
previous provisions.220 Consequently, the authors argue that only civilians who violate this
provision will face the direct consequence of being targeted.
Moreover, the authors examine the three constitutive elements of DPH from the
ICRC Interpretive Guidance and they observe that in order to satisfy the belligerent
nexus221 there has to be a certain intent, contrary to the ICRC’s position.222 Sampaio and
McEvoy disagree with the ICRC’s reasoning, and they question the ICRC’s choice to find
relevant the intent of involuntary shield and not child soldiers’ intent.223 Interestingly, Van
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Bueren argues in the same way by noting that “armed conflict are inherently brutalising
and [children’s] very nature makes it impossible for those under 18 to give free and
informed consent.”224
Sampaio and McEvoy posit that the prohibition against children’s recruitment or
participation who are under fifteen is justified by the fact that children under fifteen are not
“considered mature enough to choose to join belligerent parties to a conflict, let alone to
participate in combat operations in favor of these parties.”225 In other words, both authors
argue that children under fifteen years lack the intent to participate in hostilities “just as
involuntary human shields”, particularly “due to their presumed absolute legal incapacity
to choose to do so under international law.”226 Consequently, Sampaio and McEvoy seem
to agree with this MRP that children can never constitute legitimate target, contrary to
adults civilians unlawfully participating in hostilities or adults regular combatants.
Conclusion on the literature review
This literature review compared several approaches and positions on the question
of children’s legal protection during armed conflicts and analyzed whether children would
be better protected with a large or narrow interpretation of the terms ‘direct’ or ‘active’. To
answer this question, this literature review presented two main approaches: the
conservative and the multidimensional approach. The conservative approach was
supported by Schmitt, Naqvi, Bianchi and Wagner and was reflected by the scholars’
attempt to address the issue on child soldiers by solely focusing their analysis on IHL’s
traditional principles and by their full rejection of the broadening of concepts or terms
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related to the prohibition against child soldiering. The main answer from this approach was
a categorical refusal to broaden the concept of ‘direct’ or ‘active’ participation, which were
limited to military operations. However, only Schmitt has explicitly supported the finding
of DPH in case of doubt, thus contradicting IHL principles.
Unfortunately, this approach proved narrow and incomplete. For instance,
Schmitt’s proposition as to the finding of direct participation even in case of doubt runs
counter the principles of IHL which are aimed at the protection of civilians, especially in
case of doubt as to the scope of their liability during hostilities. Naqvi’s and Bianchi’s
attention to the proximity between the act and its consequence in the context of terrorist
activities left some gaps as to the relevance of the assessment of the intent of the combatant,
especially in the case of a children’s participation. Wagner’s design of a test aimed at
finding direct participation in case where not only there is a proximity between the act and
the consequence, but also when the act is inherently of a military nature missed all nonmilitary and indirect acts committed by children which are also prohibited by CIL and soft
law.
By contrast, the multidimensional approach as the one advocated by Sivakumaran,
Yuvaraj, Sampaio and McEvoy favoured a dialogue between several areas of international
law such as IHL, ICL and IHRL. This rich and diversified analysis has been able to clearly
demonstrate the weaknesses of IHL and ICL when tackling the issue of children’s
participation in isolation. All scholars belonging to this approach recognized that ‘direct’
and ‘active’ are both unclear and ambiguous concepts, which in the absence of a better and
consistent definition in international law, will only serve to blur the lines of the prohibition
against children’s participation in armed conflicts.
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Contrary to the conservative approach, Sivakumaran, Sampaio and McEvoy
recognized that ‘direct’ and ‘active’ participation are not synonymous. Sivakumaran,
compared IHL, ICL and IHRL and regretted that the Rome Statute undermined the existing
norms by only prohibiting children’s ‘active’ participation. However, he asserted that in
the absence of the finding of children’s ‘active’ participation, the court could still recognize
their ‘direct’ participation which is also prohibited in international law. Yuvaraj, as well as
Sampaio and McEvoy, agreed as to the necessity to distinguish between the use of the term
‘direct’ to refer to the general context of the principle of distinction and the term ‘active’
to point out to the specific context of children’s participation. This MRP agrees that such
distinction may constitute an interesting alternative to protect children from all kinds of
participation, while preserving the protection afforded to civilians who are not unlawfully
participating in armed conflicts.
In the next section, this MRP will provide its reasoning in support of the
multidimensional approach by emphasizing its potential contributions for the legal
protection of child soldiers, while highlighting some precautionary principles that armed
groups or forces need to respect when dealing with child soldiers.
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Chapter 3: Re-imagining children’s protection through IHRL and
military guidance

3. Relevance of a broader scope for children’s legal protection
At this stage, this MRP has already clarified that child civilians and child soldiers
are considered as children who are victims of the brutality and abuse of adults during armed
conflicts. In addition, this MRP demonstrated that children share the same vulnerability
and immaturity, and that these inherent commonalities have justified the establishment of
a special protection for all children under fifteen affected by armed conflicts, regardless of
their conduct or status. In this part, the author will build her arguments by contrasting or
validating some of the claims posited in the literature review by scholars, and will
emphasize the relevance of IHRL and military guidelines on the specific context of child
soldiers.
3.1 Justification for an extensive application of human rights norms in the
codification of child soldiers’ protection
Sampaio and McEvoy examined the concept of direct participation by comparing
IHL and IHRL, and they pointed out that “human rights law […] determines that, when
children are specifically concerned, all actions must be taken with their best interest as the
primary consideration.”227 As a matter of fact, the CRC has codified the principle of
children’s best interests which advocates that “in all actions concerning children, whether
undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative
authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary
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consideration.”228 Similarly, Waschefort points out that “the best interest of the child is a
trite principle of international law” which requires “a higher threshold” of legal
protection.229
Children’s best interests have been defined by the United Nations’ High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) as relating to the “well-being of a child” and is
determined “by a variety of individual circumstances, such as the age, the level of maturity
of the child, the presence or absence of parents, the child’s environment and
experiences.”230 It is clear that the experience of violence and fear during armed conflicts
by child soldiers is a relevant factor that affects their best interests.
However, Wagner asserts that, during armed conflicts, IHL has priority over other
legal regimes such as IHRL, which are supposed to apply “only in the absence of definition
under the laws of armed conflict.231 Thus, she states that the “IHL rule of direct
participation in hostilities prevails over human rights rule in a situation of armed
conflict.”232 Nevertheless, it is unfounded to exclude or to minimize the application of
IHRL during armed conflicts since IHL has also recognized the importance of human rights
through the principle of humanity. 233 To that extent, Melzer and Kuster note that “IHL
comprises those rules of international law which establish minimum standards of humanity
that must be respected in any situation of armed conflict.”234 In the same vein, Waschefort
points out that “IHL is generally, though not always, the lex specialis during armed
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conflict.”235 Moreover, he argues that “IHRL is theoretically applicable at all times,
although derogation from some provisions is permitted during states of emergency.”236
Thus, this author highlights that it is a mistake to consider that “during armed conflict, IHL
supplants IHRL totally.”237 Most importantly, Waschefort notes that “IHRL has developed
child protection with respect to prohibiting the recruitment of child soldiers significantly
in that child soldier recruitment is prevented during times of peace as well.”238 This MRP
agrees with this observation and asserts that IHRL may contribute to design a better frame
for the codification and application of the legal protection of child soldiers when combined
with IHL and ICL.
Therefore, this project argues that each time that an action or a decision involving
child soldiers has to be taken, child soldiers’ experience of violence and fear on a daily
basis should be considered. Lieutenant Colonel Leandro specified that “children remain
children even if they are carrying out intelligence activities or aiming a loaded weapon at
a peacekeeper.”239 In addition, he posits that “a child soldier is always a victim to be looked
after and is never to be held accountable.”240 Thus, despite the ambiguity on the concept of
child soldiering, the preservation of the status of children for child soldiers should remain
the priority of international law.
Since the involvement of children in armed conflicts trigger not only additional
legal considerations but also the application of human rights principles such as children’s
best interests, it is not unusual to import such principles in the specific context of child
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soldiering. To that extent, Sivakumaran points out that according to European human
rights, “lethal force may not be used against fighters in situations in which it is feasible to
arrest them” because “to kill fighters when it would have been feasible to capture them
constitutes a violation of human rights law.”241 This author recognizes that such developing
principle, though constituting “an important divergence from the position under
international humanitarian law” has started to influence IHL.242
As a matter of fact, the ICRC has asserted that “it would defy basic notions of
humanity to kill an adversary or to refrain from giving him or her an opportunity to
surrender where there manifestly is no necessity for the use of lethal force.” 243 In other
words, despite the permissive character of IHL, belligerents do not have “carte blanche to
wage unrestricted war” due to the application of some foundational human right norms,
which belongs to the principle of humanity.244 This MRP argues that this principle should
be enforced vigorously in the specific context of children’s participation in hostilities and
that every child soldier should be given an opportunity to surrender when possible.
Consequently, a multidisciplinary analysis of the issue on child soldiers’ protection
highlights that both IHL, IHRL and ICL are in favour of a strong legal framework to
enforce the prohibition against children’s participation in hostilities, although they use
different approaches. IHL protects children through the ‘special protection’ which grants
specific rights and privileges to children affected by armed conflicts. IHRL confirms this
principle and adds the necessity to preserve children’s best interests every time that a
decision involving a child has to be taken. ICL criminalised the use of children in armed
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conflict by raising such prohibition to the rank of a war crime and by confirming the lack
of legal capacity for children under fifteen years and their inability to consent to their
participation in hostilities. This MRP posits that a framework combining all these three
areas of law, while taking into considerations the knowledge and savoir-faire from military
guidelines can help strengthen children’s legal protection during armed conflicts.
3.2 Regulations for the use of force against child soldiers
This MRP argues that the legal protection of children, due to their acknowledged
vulnerabilities and immaturity requires a different methodology or approach than the one
applied to adults.245 Waschefort argues that it is a serious error to treat children and adults
with the same standards, because children do not have “the same decision-making and
cognitive abilities as adults.246 Similarly, Kuper emphasizes that “additional restraints
should be exercised when soldiers are aware that child soldiers are present in an opposing
force.”247 As a matter of fact, she points out that even soldiers on the ground with low level
of literacy and training must be aware that “IHL and human rights rules for the protection
of adults apply equally to children, and arguably should be applied to children with
particular diligence, due to their vulnerability and entitlement to ‘special treatment’.”248
The Canadian Forces JDN clarified that “given the complexities that will exist in
a given theatre if child soldiers are encountered, robust legal principles and guidance need
to be in place to ensure that CAF are aware of their legal obligations. 249 Furthermore, this
instrument points out that “legal review will be required on all mission-specific order
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addressing circumstances where there is potential involvement of child soldiers.”250 This
is a clear indication that there is a heavy legal burden on opposing forces who are aware of
the presence of child soldiers, and this burden requires them to adopt or consider additional
legal obligations of international law. For instance, this Doctrine notes that one of these
constraints “may be the requirement to report the Six Grave Violations […]” or “the
requirement to not keep detained child soldiers in the same detention location as adult
detainees.”251
Similarly, Lieutenant Colonel Leandro asserts that “targeting and self-defense
require an extensive application of the International Humanitarian Law principles” and that
“the minimum use of force and the proportionality principle are to be used together and
combined with non-lethal options in case of direct engagement” against child soldiers.252
Moreover, he points out that “the discrimination principle, in addition to its regular legal
application, should also be used to discriminate inside the military target, between regular
soldiers and child soldiers, or at least to avoid/reduce collateral damages on child
soldiers.”253 Consequently, it is clear that opposing forces who are confronted with child
soldiers need to take additional precautions that are usually not required when dealing with
regular combatants such as the consideration of the principle of proportionality.254
However, the Canadian JDN recognizes that child soldiers who serve on the
frontlines can be targeted if they pose a threat for the opposing forces provided that the
necessary precautions and additional assessments have been conducted before any
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attack.255 This Doctrine supports that the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) “will retain the
right to use force, to protect themselves from the threat of serious injury of death, even
from a child soldier” since “a child soldier with a rifle or grenade launcher can present as
much of a threat as an adult soldier carrying the same armament.”256 Furthermore, the
Canadian JDN highlights that such use of force will be selected after all other options to
protect child soldiers have been considered. As a matter of fact, this Doctrine posits that
“if forced to engage child soldiers”, opposing forces should always “seek to engage adults
within the group first” because usually “the adult leadership of a unit of child soldier will
often represent the tactical centre of gravity”, and the “loss of such authority figures will
often result in a loss of cohesion” in this unit.257
Likewise, Singer argues that “the leader’s control is the center of gravity” which
justifies the fact that armed forces should “engage adult targets first if possible.”258
Moreover, Singer posits that “if the adult leader is killed or forced to take cover, the whole
organization often breaks down.”259 Therefore, this MRP argues that the use of lethal force
against child soldiers should only be considered as a self-defence strategy when there is no
other viable option. Lieutenant Colonel Leandro points out that in the case where child
soldiers constitute a threat to peacekeeping operations, they are “a legitimate target to
detain, to keep in custody, to neutralize, to separate from adult dominance, and as a last
resort to use lethal fire with non-lethal intent.”260
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Conclusion
In this chapter, this MRP argued that international law cannot address, in a
satisfactory way, the issue on child soldiers by focusing on a narrow and incomplete
understanding of children’s participation in armed conflicts. Rather, a multidimensional
framework has to be developed to touch upon the various nuances and subtlety of this
problematic. Thus, this chapter opened a dialogue between IHL, ICL and IHRL by
underlining their shared principles and characteristics and by pointing out how such
principles may be used as foundational norms in the design of a new framework which
would also combined operational knowledge from armed forces such the Canadian Forces
and its recent Joint Doctrine. This research project posited that such need for
interdisciplinarity is justified by the massive and conflicting codification of the prohibition
against children’s participation in hostilities by several areas of law, but also by the very
specific status of children in international law.
Furthermore, this chapter addressed the flawed and narrow scope of IHL and ICL
through their use of the terms ‘direct’ and ‘active’. Thus, it highlighted that the term ‘direct’
is inappropriate for the assessment of children’s participation due to lack of intent as a
relevant constitutive element. In addition, it pointed out that ‘active’ participation, although
allowing a larger prosecution of perpetrators using children in hostilities, is problematic
due to the high and unclear threshold of ‘potential target’ and ‘real danger’ adopted by the
ICC. As a matter of fact, this MRP demonstrated that treating children’s rights in a
standardized and generic fashion as adults’ rights is a serious mistake, especially during
the context of armed conflicts because the law exceptionally granted children with an
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extensive protective legal regime (special protection), which applies to all children
regardless of their conduct or status.
Thus, this project clarified that children, due to their vulnerabilities benefit from
the maximum protection during hostilities. In fact, this project posited that every time that
children’s interests are at stake, especially during armed conflicts, international law needs
to adapt its methods to better reflect children’s vulnerabilities and lower maturity.
Therefore, this MRP stated that children’s legal status during armed conflicts challenges
IHL’s traditional principle of distinction and justifies a departure from the traditional
concepts of ‘direct’ or ‘active’ participation, while calling for a new legal framework based
on interdisciplinarity and military experience from armed forces.
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Overall conclusion

The continuing practice of child soldiering constitutes a delicate issue in
international politics where the morality and the law meet with economic, social, cultural,
historical and political factors. This MRP highlighted that this interaction complicates the
discussions on the required conditions and standards for the establishment of a strong and
broad legal regime of protection of all children affected by armed conflicts, and especially
those exploited and abused by armed groups such as child soldiers.
Despite its reluctance to tackle promptly the issue of child soldiers, Public
International Law has progressively and massively codified the prohibition against child
soldiering in several areas of law. Unfortunately, such massive codification, though
positive for contributing to the increase of the awareness on the issue of child soldiering
has created some ambiguity and uncertainty with respect to the exact scope of the
prohibition against child soldiering since several and conflicting standards were adopted.
This MRP emphasized numerous gaps as to the issue of child soldiering such as the
lack of a consensus on the meaning behind the term ‘child soldier’ and the inability to reach
strong and shared standards of protection in international law. To improve child soldiers’
legal protection, this MRP proposed to consider child soldiers as children in terms of their
rights and obligations, despite their conduct or status during hostilities. To assert that, this
MRP discussed the definition of child soldiers and the nuances derived from soft law such
as the Graça Machel report, the Cape Town Principles and the Paris Principle. All these
instruments have successfully drawn the parameters of the issue of child soldiering through
their inclusive definition and description of the context of child soldiering. This MRP noted
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that these instruments, though not binding, have approached the analysis of the practice of
child soldiering in very broad terms, thus illustrating that such issue cannot only be limited
to the examination of military roles or to the rigid principle of distinction. As explained
earlier, the Cape Town Principles have also recognized that child soldiers retain their status
as children no matter what their conduct or status is during armed conflicts. This MRP
argued that such important principle clarifies that child soldiers never lose their status and
protection as children, despite their participation in hostilities.261
This MRP has also elaborated on the concept of children’s special protection which
has been established to recognize children’s vulnerabilities and to protect them during
extreme conditions of violence such as armed conflicts, where children cannot count on
the usual protection and support of adults. Moreover, this project highlighted that the
extension of such protection towards children who participate in hostilities is a clear
indication that being involved in hostilities does not equate to lesser protection for children.
Thus, this MRP argued that since child soldiers are entitled to the same special protection
as child civilians, the elaboration of a new framework which deviates from IHL’s
traditional principle of distinction is justified.
To that extent, this MRP argued that the category of child soldiers collapses these
two categories (civilians and combatants) and requires its own framework and approach.
To reach this conclusion, this MRP also examined the concept of ‘active’ and ‘direct’
participation following the ICRC’s guide on the notion of DPH and the ICC’s findings
from the Lubanga case and it illustrated that both the ICRC and the ICC have failed to
define children’s participation and to delineate the scope of the prohibition against the
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practice of child soldiering. As explained earlier, the ICRC failed to do so by not
considering the relevance of children’s lack of intent in the assessment of their
participation, whereas the ICC designed a broad and ambiguous definition of ‘active’
participation, which instead of protecting child soldiers may place them in a more
dangerous situation.
In addition, this MRP clarified that when there are children involved in armed
conflicts, whether they are civilians or direct participants, IHL can never mechanically
apply without consulting with IHRL principles such as children’s best interests and the
military guidelines. This research project also evidenced that when some principles are
designed to protect adults such as the principle of humanity or the principle of
proportionality, they apply with even more power towards children.262 Therefore, this MRP
posited that only a broader scope of analysis on the issue of child soldiers involving IHL,
ICL, IHRL and military guidelines can help establish a stronger and more complete
protection of child soldiers. Finally, this MRP agreed with military guidelines that when
there is no other viable options, opposing forces can target child soldiers who are armed or
who constitute a threat, with lethal or non-lethal forces although they should not have a
“lethal intent”.263
This MRP supports that the law itself without military support cannot succeed in
the eradication of the continuing practice of child soldiering. Lieutenant Colonel Leandro
notes that “an essential aspect of dealing with child soldiering is indeed breaking the
recruitment chain” although such task “is not a typical military function.”264 Similarly, the
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Canadian Forces JDN argues that there should be an “effort to break the cycle of
exploitation and employment of children as child soldiers” which can take “a variety of
roles, from supporting local organizations, NGOs, and IOs, to directly delivering
information effects via military assets.”265
Thus, this MRP asserted that the issue of child soldiering is not limited to the legal
question of the prohibition against their recruitment, enlistment, use or the modalities for
targeting children involved armed conflicts, but also on how to put an end to the practice
of child soldiering. It is clear that only the latter question will allow the design of an
effective approach to tackle this alarming issue, especially with the current rise of terrorism
and extremism around the world.
While this MRP makes a strong case for the strengthening of the legal protection
of child soldiers during hostilities by using IHL, ICL, IHRL and soft law principles, there
are some limitations to this project. As indicated in his title, this MRP focused its research
on international law and did not study the principles and positions from domestic
jurisdictions related to child soldiers. Such study would have required a distinct research
and an informed selection of countries or regions to allow a comparison and a finding of
some shared patterns. Such research is beyond the scope of this MRP. Furthermore, as
confessed in its introduction, this MRP did not explore child soldiers’ criminal liabilities
and it did not discuss the possibility to prosecute them when they become perpetrators.
This is due to the fact that this project focused on child soldiers’ vulnerabilities and on the
existing gaps related to their legal protection. Finally, due to its limited scope, this MRP
did not clearly set out the underpinnings of the new framework of protection for child
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soldiers, and has briefly pointed out some major principles that would characterize such
framework.
Future research may compare the position of domestic jurisdictions to the one of
international courts and tribunals as to the issue of child soldiers’ criminal liability and
vulnerabilities. For that purpose, it would be interesting to discuss the future findings of
the Ongwen case266 in light of IHL, ICL and IHRL principles.
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